WTO dispute settlement: challenges faced by developing countries in the implementation and enforcement of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) recommendations and rulings by Pfumorodze, Jimcall
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
 
LAW FACULTY 
 
 
 
 
 
Research paper submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the LLM: 
International Trade and Investment Law (Mode I) 
 
 
Student: Jimcall Pfumorodze 
 
 
Student Number: 2674902 
 
 
TOPIC: 
 
 
WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges faced by developing countries in the 
implementation and enforcement of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
recommendations and rulings.  
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Adv. MS Wandrag 
Co-Supervisor: Dr James Mathis 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that, WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges faced by developing 
countries in the implementation and enforcement of DSB recommendations 
and rulings, is my own work, that it has not been submitted before for any degree 
or examination in any other university, and that all the sources I have used or 
quoted have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references. 
  
 Jimcall Pfumorodze 
 
 Signed: …………………………    May 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
 
DEDICATION 
 
To my wife, Marian 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
It is difficult to mention all the people who deserve to be thanked for their assistance in 
the preparation and final submission of this paper. However, there are some that deserve 
special mention within the scope of a brief acknowledgement statement. 
 
 First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisors Adv. MS Wandrag and Dr James 
Mathis for their guidance and constructive ideas and comments. I would also want to 
thank my friends, Robert, Jean and Vivienne, for their comments and moral support. I am 
also grateful for the financial assistance given by the World Bank through the University 
of Western Cape which funded this research and my whole LLM studies. Finally, I would 
like to thank the Lord for giving me the strength and health throughout my research and 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
 
KEY WORDS 
 
Arbitration, Developing countries, Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), Doha Development 
Agenda, enforcement, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), international trade disputes, 
international tribunals, rulings, World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
 
ACRONYMS 
 
 
 
AB                                                        Appellate Body  
DSB                                                      Dispute Settlement Body 
EU                                                         European Union 
GATT                                                    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GATS                                                    General Agreement on Trade in Services 
LDCs                                                     Least Developed Countries  
MFN                                                      Most Favoured Nation 
SPS                                                        Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  
WTO                                                      World Trade Organisation      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
TOPIC: i 
DECLARATION ii 
DEDICATION iii 
ACKNOWELEDGEMENT iv 
KEY WORDS v 
ACRONYMS vi
 
CHAPTER ONE………………………………………………………………………...1
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………1 
1.1 INTODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM…………………….1 
1.2 AIMS OF THE RESERCH PAPER……………………………………………….2 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH…………………………………………..3 
1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS………………………………………………………3 
1.6 SCOPE……………………………………………………………………………. 4 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTERS OVERVIEW…………….. 4 
CHAPTER TWO………………………………………………………………………..5 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
IMPLEMENDATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF DSB RULINGS AND 
RECOMMENTATIONS……………………………………………………………….5 
2.1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………5 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT STYSTEM…….5 
2.2.1 Brief Background……………………………………………………………..5 
2.2.2 Dispute Settlement under the GATT 1947……………………………………6 
2.2.3 Dispute Settlement under the WTO…………………………………………...7 
2.3 IMPLEMENTATION AND OF DSB RECOMMENTATIONS AND RULINGS.9 
2.3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………....9 
2.3.2 Compensation………………………………………………………………….9 
2.4.2 Suspension of concessions or other obligations………………………………11 
2.5 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………13 
CHAPTER THREE…………………………………………………………………….14 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMEENT PROBLEMS: STATISTICS AND 
CASE STUDIES………………………………………………………………………...14 
3.0 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...14 
3.1 STATISTICS……………………………………………………………………...14 
3.1.1 TABLES……………………………………………………………………...14 
3.1.2 COMMENT ON STATISTICS………………………………………………15 
3.2 CASE STUDY: EC-BANANAS III………………………………………………16 
3.2.1 FACTS………………………………………………………………………..16 
3.2.2 COMMENTS ON THE CASE……………………………………………….17 
3.3 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………19 
 vii
CHAPTER FOUR………………………………………………………………………20 
PROPOSALS FOR DSU REFORM: THE CHAIRMAN'S TEXT AND OTHER 
PROPOSALS…………………………………………………………………………...20 
4.1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...20 
4.2. THE EVOLUTION OF DSU REFORMS………………………………………..20 
4.3 THE DOHA 
MANDATE……………………………………………………….....21 
4.6 MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR DSU 
REFORM……………………………………..22 
4.6.1 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………22 
4.6.2 Proposals to enhance compliance with DSB rulings 
generally………………..22 
4.6.2 (a)Time 
periods……………………………………………………………..22 
4.6.2 (b) Making the Order to Comply Unambiguous and Making Use of 
Suggestions…………………………………………………………………….....2
3 
4.6.2 (c) Strengthening the Compliance Monitoring System of 
DSB……………24 
4.6.2 (d) Provisional 
remedies……………………………………………………25 
4.6.2 (e) Retrospective 
Remedies………………………………………………...26 
4.6.3 Proposals to enhance the threat of 
retaliation…………………………………28 
4.6.3 (a) Member 
sanction………………………………………………………..28 
4.6.3 (b) Collective 
Retaliation…………………………………………………...29 
4.6.3 (c) Tradable 
Remedies……………………………………………………...30 
4.6.3 (d) Cross 
Retaliation………………………………………………………..32 
            4.6.3 (e) The Sequencing Problem……………………………………………….32  
4.6.3 (f) Procedures to terminate 
retaliation……………………………………...33 
4.6.4 Proposals to enhance the value of compensation……………………………..33 
4. 6.4 (a) Request for 
compensation……………………………………………...33 
4.6.4 (b) Financial or Monetary Compensation In the WTO…………………….34 
4.6.5 Proposals for the improvement of special and differential provisions in the 
WTO dispute settlement 
system…………………………………………………...............36 
4.6.5 (a) Adding a development dimension to the Dispute 
Settlement…………..36 
 viii
4.7 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………37 
CHAPTER FIVE……………………………………………………………………….38 
DSU REFORMS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS……………….38 
5.1 INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………...38 
5.2 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS…………………………………………….39 
5.3 SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS……………………………………………..40 
5.4. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………..42 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………...44 
A. Books……………………………………………………………………………...44 
B. Journal Articles…………………………………………………………………....44 
C. Papers/Working Papers/Reports/Speech…………………………………………..47 
D.WTO Agreements………………………………………………………………….48 
E.WTO Cases………………………………………………………………………...48 
F.WTO Documents…………………………………………………………………..49 
G. Other Cases………………………………………………………………………….49                               
H. Websites……………………………………………………………………………..49 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
  
CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 INTODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
The WTO dispute settlement system which in 1995 succeeded the system under GATT 
1947 is one of the major developments in the international dispute settlement1. It fosters a 
rule based dispute settlement system as opposed to a power based system2. However, 
despite the creation of a power based and binding system, the system still has a weak 
enforcement mechanism. Some commentators say that this was an outcome of a 
compromise between the negotiators3. On one hand, they wanted a strong dispute 
settlement system and on the other they wanted a weaker enforcement mechanism. This 
was to balance the interests of negotiators who were aware that their countries may be 
involved in WTO dispute settlement as both complainants and defendants, so they 
wanted to insulate themselves from both sides. As complainants, they wanted their case 
to be heard under a rule based system and as defendants they wanted to have the policy 
space not to implement the DSB rulings which are politically sensitive or which are 
against their interests. 
 
Thus it should be clear from the onset that a weak enforcement mechanism was intended 
and was an outcome of a compromise. Although the enforcement system is weak, 
developed countries are able to use it against each other and against developing countries. 
                                                 
1 See Fukunaga, Y (2006) 42 
2 Jackson, J. H (1997) 1 
3 Hudec, H (1999) 1.See also Jackson, J.H (1997) 3 
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They can effectively use retaliation4, or the threat of retaliation, in most cases5. On the 
contrary, developing countries cannot effectively use retaliation against developed 
countries due to the fact that their economies are weak. The main problem therefore is 
that developing countries are left without any effective remedy in the WTO dispute 
settlement. This study seeks to explore the challenges which are faced by developing in 
enforcing DSB recommendations and rulings and to suggest for mechanisms which 
should be put in place to assist developing countries when they are faced with non-
compliance by developed countries. 
 
The second problem is that the WTO remedies are only prospective in nature. The current 
remedies only focus on inducing compliance instead of focusing on compensating for the 
injury which has been suffered by the complainant. Thus presently the compensation is 
quantified from the period the reasonable time of period to implement DSB rulings 
lapses6. It does not seek to compensate the injured party from the date of infringement. 
This would in turn give the responding parties an incentive to delay the dispute settlement 
proceedings as much as they can while benefiting from an infringement of WTO 
Agreements. This is unfair and trade restrictive and needs to be solved in order to 
improve the implementation and enforcement of DSB rulings. 
 
1.2 AIMS OF THE RESERCH PAPER 
 
This paper seeks:- 
(a) To examine the legal framework of implementation and enforcement of DSB 
recommendations and rulings. 
(b) To investigate the trend of non-compliance with BSD recommendations and 
rulings where a complainant is a developing country.  
                                                 
4 This term is usually used to refer to suspension of concessions and other obligations in terms of Article 22 
of the DSU 
5 A study undertaken by Bagwell et al (2003) shows that developed countries do retaliate against each other 
like in EC Banana III case where the US retaliated against the EU. 
6 See Article 22 of the DSU 
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(c) To evaluate the effectiveness of the implementation and enforcement of DSB 
rulings and recommendations. 
(d) To critically analyse proposals which have been tabled by Members for the 
reform of implementation and enforcement of DSB rulings during the ongoing 
DSU reform negotiations. 
(e) To make recommendations for the DSU reform in relation to the implementation 
and enforcement system of the DSB recommendations and rulings. 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The significance of this study is based on the above highlighted problems. This research 
on the challenges faced by developing countries in the enforcement of DSB 
recommendations and rulings is important especially at this moment where more 
developing countries are actively participating in the WTO dispute settlement system as 
complainants, defendants and third parties. A total of 356 complainants have been 
notified to the WTO, and 135 of which are complaints from developing countries7. This 
high level of utilization of the WTO dispute settlement system shows a growing 
confidence in the system. The above figures also show that developing countries are also 
utilizing the dispute settlement system8. 
 
It is important for negotiators and policy makers from developing countries to understand 
the challenges they are facing and to be able to suggest useful improvements in their 
proposals during the on going DSU review negotiations. With such an understanding, it 
increases the participation of developing countries not only during the negotiation 
process but ultimately in the dispute settlement process itself. This in turn ensures the 
security and predictability, which is the cornerstone of the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 
 
                                                 
7 WTO Statistics, WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January 2007  
8 See Mosoti, V (2006) 17, where the author analyzed the participation of African countries in the first 
decade of WTO dispute settlement. 
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1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
The investigative assumption, which the proposed research will examine, is that the DSB 
enforcement mechanism is not effective in ensuring compliance with recommendations 
and rulings especially when the complainant is a developing country. Remedies available 
in the WTO cannot be utilised effectively by developing countries. This failure by the 
enforcement mechanism to take in to account the interests of developing countries calls 
for a reform of the system with a view to affording effective remedies to developing 
countries.  
 
1.6 SCOPE 
 
The subject area under consideration is a vast one. For this reason this research will 
mainly focus on compensation and retaliation and how these can be improved so that 
developing countries can also have effective remedies under the WTO dispute settlement 
system. Thus this paper will mainly only focus on substantive issues, as opposed to 
procedural issues, of implementation and enforcement of DSB recommendations and 
rulings. 
 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTERS OVERVIEW 
 
This study shall basically be literature based with emphasis on the analysis of the relevant 
available literature on the subject matter. The study shall rely on both primary and 
secondary sources of literature. On primary sources regard will be given to WTO 
Agreements, WTO cases, WTO case statistics, and WTO Members’ proposals.  
 
On secondary sources reference will be taken from various background papers, books, 
and academic or scholarly articles. Various internet sites will be consulted for relevant 
up-to-date data and information. 
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This paper is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter gives an introduction and 
general statement of the problem; the second chapter covers the legal framework of 
implementation and enforcement of DSB rulings and recommendations, the third chapter 
provides statistics and a case study, chapter four discusses proposals for reform and is 
followed by recommendations and conclusion in chapter five.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK OF IMPLEMENDATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
DSB RULINGS AND RECOMMENTATIONS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the WTO dispute settlement system. The main 
thrust of this chapter is on the substantive issues relating to the implementation and 
enforcement of DSB rulings and recommendations, namely compensation and retaliation. 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT STYSTEM 
 
2.2.1 Brief Background  
The period preceding the World War II was marked by isolationism and this partly 
contributed not only to the Great Depression but also to the World War II9. In a bid to 
solve these economic concerns, in July 1944, the parties attended a conference at Breton 
Woods, New Hampshire where the IBRD (World Bank) and IMF were formed. In 1945 
                                                 
9 Palmeter, D  (2004) 1  
 5
the US issued a proposal for an International Trade Organization (ITO) but this soon 
proved to be fruitless as the US Congress refused to approve it10. 
 
However, it should be noted that although the ITO did not come into fruition, the 
governments were interested in relaxing tariffs and other trade restrictions more rapidly 
hence the negotiation for the GATT 1947. This led to the Geneva Final Act which 
consisted of the text of the GATT 1947 and the schedules of tariff commitments made by 
the 25 governments taking part .It also included a Protocol of Provisional Application 
(PPA), a measure intended to be a temporary expedient, but which ended up being 
fundamental to GATT 1947 for its 47 years of existence11. On 1 January 1995 the GATT 
was overtaken by the WTO. There are some fascinating differences between the dispute 
settlement under the GATT 1947 and under the WTO and these will be discussed below. 
 
2.2.2 Dispute Settlement under the GATT 1947 
 
Hudec (2003) noted that the early dispute settlement in GATT reflected its diplomatic 
roots to the extent that the process was initially dubbed as conciliation and not dispute 
settlement12. Davey (1987) observed that the goal of the process was more to reach a 
solution mutually agreeable to the parties than to render a decision in a legal dispute13. 
 
GATT 1947 had only two provisions dealing with dispute settlement, namely Article 
XXII and XXIII14. However, Articles XXII and XXIII did not contain any specific 
procedures to be followed by disputing parties or even the Contracting Parties in 
                                                 
10 Gardner, R (1980) 1  
11 Palmeter, D (2004) 4 
12 Hudec, R (1993) 12 
13 Davey , W J(1987) 65   
14 Article XXII deals with consultations, while Article XXIII deals with nullification and impairment. 
Under Article XXIII, an aggrieved party could make written representations or proposals to another party 
who is causing harm. If this party did not fully address the situation, the complainant was authorized to 
refer the matter to the contracting parties who would in turn investigate and make recommendations. 
Article XXIII: 2 permitted the Contracting Parties to authorize the complainant to suspend the application 
of tariff concessions or other GATT obligations to the offending member in appropriate cases. 
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resolving a dispute. Some formalities were added later on in subsequent negotiation 
rounds and Ministerial Conferences15. 
 
The GATT dispute settlement had fundamental shortcomings. Bossche (2005) noted that 
the manner in which key decisions were taken, that is, the establishment and composition 
of a panel, the adoption of panel reports and the authorization of suspension of 
concessions, were all taken by the GATT Council by consensus16. Thus the responding 
party could delay or block any of these decisions and paralyze or frustrate the operation 
of the dispute settlement system17.Thus it can be concluded that under GATT 1947, the 
dispute settlement system was entirely in the hands of the parties. Hudec (1999) made the 
following interesting remarks concerning GATT dispute settlement system:- 
 
' The sentiment at the time was that dispute settlement worked better on the whole if 
defendant governments participated on a voluntary basis, and that it would not be 
productive to try to force governments into adjudicatory rulings they are not prepared to 
accept’.18
 
Concerning remedies, the GATT 1947 provided for three remedies only namely 
recommendation to comply, compensation and the suspension of concessions or any 
other obligations under the covered agreements19. However, as noted above, these 
remedies were not effective due to the issue of positive consensus. Thus, it should be 
noted that from the onset the governments showed no political commitment to make an 
effective system of implementation and enforcement of rulings and 
recommendations20.This shows that the weakness of the WTO dispute settlement system 
                                                 
15  For instance, during the Tokyo Round (1973-79) the Contracting Parties adopted the 'Undertaking on 
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance of 28 November 1979, which included an 
annex setting out an Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute 
Settlement. 
16 Bossche ,P  (2005) 172    
17 However, the potential of the respondent to block the proceedings under GATT 1947 should not be 
overemphasized as a study undertaken by Hudec (1993) shows that from 1947 to 1992; the losing party 
eventually accepted the results of an adverse panel report in approximately 90% of the cases17. Note should 
be taken of the fact that still Members would exercise their power to block in sensitive matters, especially 
in the 1980s. 
18 Hudec, E  (1999) 1 
19 See Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947 
20 Hudec, E   (2000) 1    
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is a design and not an accident. However, it is the developing countries who are the 
biggest losers in this system hence the need to improve the enforcement mechanism. 
 
2.2.3 Dispute Settlement under the WTO 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system which came into operation in 1995 was innovative. 
It is governed by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU).21 Its prime objective is the prompt settlement of disputes between 
WTO Members concerning their rights and obligations under the covered agreements. 
There are two important policy considerations referred in the DSU namely, protecting the 
security and predictability of the DSS and satisfactory settlement of disputes22. Jackson 
(1997) argues that these two policy issues may conflict with each other as sometimes the 
need to reach a satisfactory settlement may compromise the security and predictability of 
the dispute settlement system.23
 
Boosche (2005) noted the following new innovations in the dispute settlement system.24 
First, the quasi-automatic adoption of requests for the establishment of panels, of panel 
reports and of the request to authorize suspension of concessions. Secondly, the strict 
time frames for various stages of the dispute settlement process and lastly, the possibility 
of appellate review of panel reports.25
 
 The DSB plays a very crucial role in WTO dispute settlement system particularly in 
ensuring implementation and enforcement of its rulings and recommendations26. It is 
made up of all the representatives of every WTO Member and it deals with disputes 
arising under any of the WTO Agreements, and it does so in accordance with the 
                                                 
21   Annex 2 to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation .  
22 Article 3(2) of the DSU 
23 Jackson, J (2004)  109 
24 Boosche,P (2005)  172 
25   However, the same learned author observed that the WTO dispute settlement system retained some 
characteristics of power-based dispute settlement through diplomatic negotiations regarding consultations, 
the role of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the confidentiality of the proceedings 
26  The DSB is the WTO General Council with a dispute settlement hat 
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provisions of the DSU. The DSU confers compulsory jurisdiction on the DSB for the 
purpose of resolving disputes.27 The DSB establishes  dispute settlement,28 adopts reports 
from panels and the Appellate Body,29 maintains surveillance of implementation of 
rulings and recommendations it adopts,30 and authorizes the suspension of concessions 
and other obligations under the covered agreements, if its rulings and recommendations 
are not acted upon timely.31 It also deserves mention at this juncture that WTO reports 
are adopted automatically unless there is a consensus to the contrary.32
 
2.3 IMPLEMENTATION AND OF DSB RECOMMENTATIONS AND RULINGS 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Although there are many procedural aspects on the implementation and enforcement of 
DSB rulings, this section will primarily deal with remedies available when the DSB 
ruling is in favour of the complainant. The remedies available in the WTO dispute 
settlement system are provided for in the DSU33. The primary and preferred remedy is 
the withdrawal or amendment of a WTO inconsistent measure34. However, sometimes 
the respondent may not be able to comply promptly and the complainant may have one of 
the following temporary remedies namely compensation and suspension of concessions 
or other obligations.35  
                                                 
27  Article 1 of the DSU 
28  Article 1 of the DSU 
29  Article 21 of the DSU 
30  Article 19 of the DSU 
31  Article 22(2) of the DSU 
32  Article 1 of the DSU 
33  Article 22 of the DSU 
34  Article 22.2 of the DSU  
35 The latter remedy is also known within the WTO jurisprudence as retaliation, or trade sanction or 
countermeasures. 
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 2.3.2 Compensation 
This is usually where a respondent offers to reduce its tariff on another product which is 
of interest to the complainant so as to solve the imbalance in trade which has been caused 
by the respondent’s violation of WTO Agreements.36 Compensation is given on an MFN 
basis.37 This remedy has attracted a lot of criticism in that it is ineffective and does not 
ensure compliance with DSB recommendations and rulings.38 In cases where the 
respondent fails to withdraw or amend a WTO inconsistent measure, both parties have to 
agree to compensation. Parties seldom reach an agreement with regard to compensation. 
So far compensation was agreed upon in 3 cases only.39 Compensation concerns only 
damages suffered in the future, so it is prospective and not retroactive.  
 
Palmeter (2003) succinctly captures the setbacks of compensation in the following words: 
    
'Neither the complaining nor the responding government normally would have interest in 
compensation. In accepting compensation, the complaining government agrees to a 
solution that does nothing to the industry experiencing trade damage as a result of the 
non-complying measure; in offering compensation the respondent government effectively 
selects an “innocent” industry to pay the bill, in the form of less protection, for the 
benefits conferred on the favored industry. Both governments are likely to look upon this 
exercise as a “lose-lose” proposition.' 40  
 
                                                 
36 Compensation can also be in other forms other than tariff reductions. For instance, in Japan-Alcoholic 
Beverage II case, the parties agreed on compensation which took the form of temporary, additional market 
access concessions for certain products of interest to the original complainants.See  Japan - Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages - Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes WT/DS10/15 , WT/DS11/13,WT/DS8/15. 
 
37  Article 22.1 of the DSU. 
38 See Palmeter ,D (2004) 364 
39 In 2 of these the parties agreed on tariff reductions as compensation. See Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, 
Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/ 41, 26 February 1998 and Turkey –Textiles, 
DSB, Minutes of Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/116, and 31 January 2002. In one case, monetary 
compensation was agreed upon, see US – Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act (US- Section 110(5), 
Notification of Mutually Satisfactory Temporary Agreement, WT/DS160/23, 26 June 2003.  
40  Palmeter, D (2003) 364   
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The other criticism of compensation is that because of the MFN rule, trade compensation 
can be very expensive.41 In addition, it may be very difficult to find products on which 
compensation can be offered and which are of interest for the complainant. 
Compensation should also be attractive for the affected industry otherwise it may be 
difficult to sustain politically especially where the case has been initiated as a result of a 
complaint by the industry.42  
 
Thus the serious flaws of compensation are that it is counter productive, it does not offer 
relief to those actually damaged and it damages innocent bystanders. So this remedy 
needs to be revisited to make it more effective. 
 
2.4.2 Suspension of concessions or other obligations/ Retaliation 
 
This is provided for in Article 22 of the DSU. It usually takes the form of drastic 
increases in custom duties by the complainant on selected products of export interest to 
the offending Member.43
 
Retaliation was originally intended to restore the reciprocal balance of benefits between 
the Contracting Parties.44 The Appellate Body has added that the suspension of 
concessions is expected to achieve another goal, namely to ‘induce compliance’45. In the 
WTO, the level of retaliation shall be equivalent to the level of nullification and 
impairment of benefits caused by violating measures.46 When assessing the nullification 
or impairment of the benefits, Arbitrators limit their calculation to a quantifiable trade 
                                                 
41 See Bourgeois, J (2006) 37 
42 See Burgeois  J (2005) 45 
43  Retaliatory measures can also take the form of suspension of other obligations rather than the suspension 
of tariff concessions. For instance, in US-1916 Act, the EC requested the DSB to authorize the suspension 
of the application of the obligations under GATT 1994 and the Anti-Dumping Agreement in order to adopt 
an equivalent to the 1916 Act against imports from the US. See   Award of the Arbitrator, United States- 
Anti-Dumping Act of 1916- Arbitration under Article 21.3 (c) of the DSU, WT/DS136/11, WT/DS162/14, 
28 February 2001,p. 38. 
44 See Dam, K W (1970) 196. See also Long, O (1985) 78 
45  See Article 22.6 Arbitrations’ Award (US), EC- Bananas III (supra) 
46 The arbitrators of Article 22.6 stated that the term ‘equivalent’ connotes a ‘correspondence, identity or 
stricter balance’ than what was required under the ‘appropriateness’ standard of Article XXIII: 2 of GATT 
1947. See Article 22.6 Arbitrations’ Award (US), EC- Bananas III (supra)   
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loss caused by violating measures.47 This approach is different from that of Panels that 
regard to the nullification or impairment broadly as including both quantifiable and 
unquantifiable loss48.  Thus it can be argued that it is illogical to make a party responsible 
for violations based on a broader concept of nullification and impairment, and at a later 
stage, to allow retaliation equivalent to a narrower concept of nullification and 
impairment of benefits.49
 
The other practical difficult is that the approach which limits the calculation to trade loss 
does not accurately reflect the reality of the nullification or impairment caused by 
violating measures.50 For example, an illegal SPS measure would not affect the 
complaining party only but will also have an economic impact on industries with related 
export goods. If the complaining party is a developing country, the trade loss caused by 
such an illegal SPS measures can destroy the whole economy.51 Hence a need to amend 
the DSU to reflect the needs of developing countries in the assessment of the nullification 
and impairment by taking into account the broad economic impact of illegal measures.52
 
Retaliatory measures themselves would be inconsistent with WTO obligations were they 
not authorized by the DSB. The entire concern of the WTO is trade liberalization. 
Retaliatory measures are trade restrictive and consequently they compound the negative 
effect of a violation. The result is a setback to the whole system. 
 
Developing countries can not effectively employ retaliation against developed countries. 
If they try to do so, it hurts them by cutting access to foreign goods and or making those 
goods expensive for domestic consumers. The suspension of concessions and other 
obligations by the complaining party may not effectively influence the trade flows and 
trade policies of a developed country. For instance, in EC-Bananas III case, Ecuador was 
authorized to apply retaliatory measures for an amount of US$201.6 million a year but 
                                                 
47 See Fukunaga, Y (2006) 42. See also Article 22.6 Arbitrations’ Award (US), EC- Bananas III (supra)   
48 See  Article 22.6 Arbitrations’ Award (US), EC- Bananas III (supra)   
49 See Fukunaga, Y (2006) 43. 
50 See Charnovitz, S (2001) 611 
51 See Charnovitz ,S  (2001) 168 
52 See Jurgerson T, (2005) 327. See also the  African Group Proposal 
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found it impossible to make use of this possibility without causing severe damage to its 
own economy.53 The authorisation as given in 1999 but up to now Ecuador has not 
retaliated because it is not feasible. She lacks the economic muscle to wrestle against the 
EC. This serves to confirm the notion that developing countries lack adequate 
enforcement mechanisms under the WTO dispute settlement, hence the call for reform.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has traced the development of the WTO dispute settlement system from its 
early roots under GATT 1947 to GATT 1994. It has been shown that although under 
GATT 1994 the implementation and enforcement of the DSB was improved, there is still 
no political commitment to make the system effective. It was also shown that the current 
enforcement mechanism is in favour of developed countries at the expense of developing 
countries. Thus there is a need to devise an enforcement mechanism which can also be 
utilized by developing countries in the event that they are faced with non-compliance by 
developed countries. The next chapter provides a case study which further highlights the 
dilemma of developing countries when they are faced with a situation of non compliance 
by developed countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53    Award of the Arbitrator, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas- Arbitration under Article 21.3 (c) of the DSU, WT/DS27/15, 7 January 1998, DSR 1998: I, 19 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMEENT PROBLEMS: 
STATISTICS AND CASE STUDIES 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter begins by providing statistics on participation of developed and developing 
countries in the WTO dispute settlement, and statistics on authorizations of suspension of 
concessions. The second part of this chapter will consider a case study which deals with 
challenges faced by developing countries in the implementation and enforcement of DSB 
recommendations and rulings. 
3.1 STATISTICS 
3.1.1 TABLES 
Table A54
 
ANALYSIS OF COMPLAINTS BY DEVELOPED/DEVELOPING MEMBERS 
 
                                                 
54 Adapted from WTO statistics , WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January , 2007 
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COMPLAINTS BY DEVELOPED COUNTRY MEMBERS 
Respondents – Developed 133 
Respondents – Developing 82 
COMPLAINTS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS 
Respondents – Developed 78 
Respondents – Developing 57 
COMPLAINTS BY BOTH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS 
Respondents – Developed 6 
Respondents – Developing 0 
 
Table B55
 
Active 
Compliance 
Panels56
Adopted Appellate 
Body and Panel 
Compliance 
Reports57  
Arbitrations on 
Level of Suspension 
of Concessions58  
WTO 
Authorizations of 
Suspension of 
Concessions59
Reporting 
period/ date 
on reporting date since 1.1.1995 since 1.1.1995 since 1.1.1995 
Number 4 19 16 15 
 
 
3.1.2 COMMENT ON STATISTICS 
 
Table A shows that in 82 cases where the developed countries were complainants, 
developing countries were respondents. There are 78 complainants made by developing 
countries in which the developed countries were respondents. It is only in 58 cases where 
                                                 
55 Adapted from WTO statistics, WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January , 2007 
56 This category encompasses pending or suspended panel or appellate review proceedings pursuant to Article 21.5 of 
the DSU. 
57 This category includes reports resulting from proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU. 
58 This category covers arbitration proceedings pursuant to Article 22.6 and 22.7 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the 
Subsidies Agreement. 
59 This category covers authorizations granted by the WTO pursuant to Article 22.7 of the DSU and Article 4.10 of the 
Subsidies Agreement. 
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developing countries complained against their fellow developing countries. These 
statistics indicate that developing countries are also actively participating in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. What is worrying is that there are many cases where 
developing countries are complaining against developed countries. The problem is that in 
the event that the DSB has ruled in favour of developing countries and there is no 
compliance with such a ruling, there is very little which developing countries could do to 
ensure compliance by developed countries. 
 
Table B shows that since 1995, the DSB has adopted 19 Appellate Body and Panel 
Compliance Reports and that there were 16 arbitrations on the level of suspension of 
concessions. It also reveals that the WTO has authorized suspension of concessions in 15 
cases. This shows that retaliation is not widely used in the WTO. In most cases 
developing countries refrain from requesting authorization of suspension of concession 
because they are unable to retaliate due to their weaker economical muscle60. Guatemala 
did not request authorization to impose countermeasures against the EC for the failure of 
the latter to implement the panel and AB report on Bananas61. Likewise, Honduras did 
not request authorization to impose countermeasures against the EC for the failure of the 
latter to implement the panel and AB report on Bananas62. This explains why the rate of 
retaliation is low. These statistics also militates against the proposal by some Members 
that there should be tradable remedies in the WTO .It shows that Members are not willing 
to utilize retaliation in their even in their own cases and it is most unlikely they would by 
the right to retaliate.63 This serves to indicate that there is need to formulate effective and 
practical remedies in the WTO if developing countries are to benefit from the system. 
 
                                                 
60 See Bagwell, K (2003)1 
61 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- WT/DS27. See  
WT/DS/OV/29,9 January 2007 
62 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- WT/DS27. See  
WT/DS/OV/29,9 January 2007 
63See proposal by Mexico, WTO. 2002. ``Dispute Settlement Body - Special Session - Negotiations on 
Improvements and Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding -Proposal by Mexico,'' 
November 4, catalogue record TN/DS/W/23. 
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3.2 CASE STUDY: EC-BANANAS III64  
 
3.2.1 FACTS 
In 1996, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and US contested the new EU banana 
regime at the WTO, claiming that it discriminated against their producers and marketing 
companies. The object of attach was the allocation of quotas. The WTO panel report 
found that the EU banana import regime was in violation of the WTO non-discrimination 
and market access rules. On appeal, the Appellate Body endorsed most of the panel's 
conclusions. 
 
During 1998, the EU revised its regime. It continued to maintain two tariff rate quotas, 
but assigned import quotas for non-ACP bananas on the basis of historical market shares 
and abolished the operator categories for allocation of licenses. Consultations regarding 
the WTO-consistency of the new measures were inconclusive. Just before January 1999, 
the US sought authorization to retaliate. To this EU responded that the US should first 
obtain a panel finding that the new mechanism did not conform to WTO rules65 
something Ecuador then requested. The DSB reconvened the original panel to examine 
both requests. Concurrently, the US sought authorization from the DSB to retaliate 
against the EU in the amount of US$520 million, to which the EU responded with a 
request for arbitration. The panel determined the level of nullification suffered by the US 
to be equivalent to US$191.4 million. The US was subsequently authorized to raise to 
raise duties against the EU by that amount. 
 
Towards the end of 1999, Ecuador also sought and obtained authorization to retaliate. 
Ecuador argued that its merchandise imports from the EU were too small to allow full 
retaliation (set at $200 million by the arbitrators) to occur against imports of EU goods. It 
                                                 
64 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas- WT/DS27. See  
WT/DS/OV/29,9 January 2007 
 
 
 
65 This is the basis of the so called sequencing problem 
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obtained authorization to suspend concessions under other agreements, including TRIPS, 
after having exhausted the possibilities for retaliating against the of EU consumer goods. 
 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico did not seek authorization for retaliation. 
   
 3.2.2 COMMENTS ON THE CASE 
 
The above case is very significant in the history of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
This was the first time the request for retaliation was made by a developing country. This 
was also the first time where the approval for cross- retaliation was sought. Cross- 
retaliation refers to a situation where a winning party is authorized to suspend concession 
on other sectors apart from those being the subject matter of the case.66 This was also the 
case in which the sequencing problem surfaced67.  
 
In this case Ecuador was authorized to suspend its commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and under the TRIPS Agreement, in addition to 
the imposition of duties. However, despite all this, Ecuador did not retaliate against the 
EU because doing so would not have any significant effect on the EU because the 
Ecuadorian economy is too small. This serves to show that developing countries cannot 
effectively retaliate against developed countries. It also shows that cross- retaliation is not 
an effective solution to developing countries.68 Since Ecuador could not retaliate on its 
own, and cross-retaliation could not help either, it can be suggested that it is high time 
collective retaliation is considered in the WTO if developing countries are to make any 
significant retaliation against developed countries.69 However, the merits of this proposal 
will not be considered here but in the next chapter.   
                                                 
66 See Alavi ,A (2007) 25 
67 This problem is discussed in detail in the next chapter 
68 See Subramanium A, (2000) 1 on a discussion on whether TRIPS can serve as an enforcement device for 
developing countries where it is argued that this cannot be effective and it may have an undesirable effect 
on limiting market access and attracting investment by developing countries. 
69This proposal was made by India and its effect is that where a Member has been found to be in violation 
of the WTO Agreement(s) and has failed to comply with the DSB recommendation or ruling, there should 
be joint action by all other Members on the suspension of concession. The effect of this is that there will be 
withdrawal of market access commitments by all Members of the WTO  
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 In contrast to Ecuador, the US was authorized to retaliate in the sum of US$191.4 million 
and it successfully raised the duties against the EU in that amount. This shows that 
retaliation against a developed country may only be effective when it is done by another 
developed country. Hence the need to find remedies which can be beneficial to 
developing countries. 
 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico did not request authorization to retaliate against the 
EC for the failure of the latter to implement the panel and AB report on this case. As 
complainants they were also interested in finding an effective remedy but the WTO 
dispute settlement did not give them any. Unlike Ecuador, they refrained from seeking 
any authorization to retaliate. After having participated in the whole long process of the 
WTO dispute settlement up to the Appellate Body, they got what they wanted only on 
paper and could not enforce it. This is one of the reasons why developing countries shun 
from participating in the WTO dispute settlement. They have no incentive to do so since 
they are not assured of an effective remedy.  This calls for a reform of remedies to 
accommodate the needs and interests of developing countries. 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The above information has illustrated that developing and least developed countries are 
becoming more active in bringing cases in the WTO. However, it has also been shown 
that in cases of non-compliance such developing countries have no effective means to 
ensure compliance by their stronger counterparts, developed countries. This calls for 
rethinking of WTO remedies and this is the subject matter under consideration in the next 
two chapters. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PROPOSALS FOR DSU REFORM 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding three chapters have highlighted the problems which are currently being 
faced by developing countries in the enforcement of DSB recommendations and rulings. 
This chapter will focus on the attempts which have been made by Members to solve some 
of these issues with a view to smoothening WTO dispute settlement system and to make 
it effective from 1995 to date.    
 
4.2. THE EVOLUTION OF DSU REFORMS 
 
The history of DSU reform is succinctly put by Davey (2004).70 Discussions on 
reforming the WTO dispute settlement system began in 1997 in response to a decision 
that has been adopted at the Marrakech Ministerial Conference by which Members 
agreed to review the DSU within four years.71
 
                                                 
70  Davey ,W (2004) 1  
71  Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, in WTO, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: 
The Legal Texts 465 (WTO  1994). 
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The DSU Review began in 1998. Members did not seem to have much ambition and they 
seemed to be satisfied by the then prevailing system.72 Many general proposals for 
change were discussed but only very few technical ones garnered much support73. 
January 1999 witnessed the so-called Bananas case where there was a dispute between 
the EC and US over the procedures to be followed when a Member allegedly fails to 
implement DSB recommendations within a reasonable period of time permitted by 
Article 21 of the DSU.74 Although the matter was finally amicably resolved, Members 
felt the need to remove the ambiguities that existed in the text of Articles 21.5 and 22 of 
the DSU. The DSU review finally came to an end on July 30, 1999, but Members did not 
reach any consensus.75  
4.3 THE DOHA MANDATE 
 
In 2001 the reform of the DSU was put on the Doha mandate. The November 2001 Doha 
Ministerial Declaration provides as follows: 
   '30.We agree to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the DSU. The 
negotiations should be based on the work thus far as well as any additional proposals by 
Members, and aim to agree on improvements and clarifications not later than May 2003, 
at which time we will take steps to ensure that the results enter into force as soon as 
possible thereafter'.76
 
The dispute settlement negotiations were put on a ‘fast track’ than the remaining 
negotiation subjects. This can be  explained by the fact that the Members did not want the 
proposed reforms to become hostage to trade-offs in the general negotiations under the 
                                                 
72  See WT/DSB/W/74 for a summary of suggestions on how the review might be conducted. 
73 Davey (2004) 1 
74  European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27. 
75 However, the discussion still continued in a group led by Suzuki and eventually led to the proposal to 
amend the DSU to be made at the Seattle Ministerial Conference. The proposal as made at Seattle involved 
several major changes. Although there was considerable support for the proposal, no action on any issue 
was taken at Seattle, see   WT/MIN (99)/8 & Corr.1. These changes include resolving the sequencing 
problem between Articles 21.5 and 22, and detailed provisions for the implementation and surveillance of 
WTO dispute settlement. 
76  WT/MIN (01)/DEC/1. 
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Doha Mandate.77 It is also worth noting that the DSU negotiations had to take note of the 
negotiations which were done before November 2001. 
 
After several formal and informal meetings, these negotiations culminated into a 
consolidation of proposals in a document called the Chairman's Text of 28 May 2003.78 
However, it proved impossible for the Members to reach an agreement on a Text by end 
of May 2003. Even though the Members did not reach an agreement, it is interesting to 
note that this was the first time Members attempted some comprehensive DSU reforms. 
The next section discusses in detail the Members proposals. It is no longer important to 
distinguish between proposals which were included in the Chairman’s Text and those 
which were not because Members agreed to open up to new proposals, so proposals in the 
Chairman’s Text no longer carry any special weight.79  
 
4.6 MAJOR PROPOSALS FOR DSU REFORM  
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
This section deals with some crucial proposals which are under consideration during the 
ongoing DSU reform negotiations. It evaluates various proposals with a view to find and 
to recommend those proposals which will benefit developing countries in the 
implementation and enforcement of DSB recommendations and rulings. For the sake of 
convenience, these proposals can be arbitrarily classified as follows: those which seek to 
enhance compliance with DSB rulings generally, proposals which seek to enhance the 
threat of retaliation, proposals which seek to enhance the value of compensation and 
those which seek the improvement of the special and differential treatment in the WTO 
                                                 
77 See Kessie, E (2004)  115 
78 TN/DS/9,pp.3-19. 
79 See WT/GC/M/81, para. 72 ( meeting of 24-25 July 2003 ), where it was agreed that‘(i) that the time for 
the conclusion of the negotiations on clarifications and improvements of the DSU be extended by one year, 
that is, to conclude the work by May 2004 at the latest, (ii) that this continued work build on the work done 
to date, and take account proposals put forward by Members as well as the text put forward by the 
Chairman of the Special Sessions of the DSB; and (iii)........’ 
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dispute settlement system. These categories are not cast in stones and may sometimes 
overlap. 
 
4.6.2 Proposals to enhance compliance with DSB rulings generally 
4.6.2 (a) Time periods 
 
There is a proposal which seeks to shorten some time periods in the DSU and more 
specifically on the panel report adoption, appeal and adoption of report and reasonable 
period for implementation.80 It is suggested that the issue of shortening of time periods 
should not override the ultimate goal is the WTO dispute settlement system, namely to 
secure certainty, predictability and security of the system. This is one of the areas where 
the input of Members of the Appellate Body is useful. Members should avoid making 
proposals alone without consulting some important stakeholders whose experience is 
important. Thus is suggested that the Members should take note of the experience of the 
Appellate Body members and the WTO Secretariat in making some procedural changes 
to the DSU.81
 
India and others have also proposed that the reasonable period of time for implementation 
by a developing country should be 15 months, with a 2 year period applicable if a change 
has to be made to a statute or a long held policy.82 The period of time which India is 
suggesting is too long. It is better if the panels take it on a case by case basis otherwise 
some developing countries may delay unnecessarily.83
 
There is also a proposal to put a new Article 3.13 is proposed that would allow any time 
period in the DSU to be extended by mutual agreement of parties84 . This proposal may 
lead to delays especially in the implementation and enforcement of DSB rulings and 
recommendations. Thus this proposal is not acceptable because it may be manipulated by 
                                                 
80 See The Chairman’s Text TN/DS/9,pp.3-19 
81 See Ehlermann, C (2004) 105-114 
82 See Ehlermann, C (2004) 105-114 
83 See Mavroidis, P (2004) 61-74 
84 See The Chairman’s Text TN/DS/9,pp.3-19 
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bigger states at the expense of weaker ones. They may use their economic strength to 
influence the extension of periods under the DSU and this compromises the security and 
predictability of the dispute settlement system 
4.6.2 (b) Making the Order to Comply Unambiguous and Making Use of 
Suggestions 
 
Article 19 of the DSU provides as follows: 
    '1.Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a 
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure 
into conformity with that agreement85. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or 
Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the 
recommendations.  
    2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, 
the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements'. 
 
 The orders to comply are framed in the most general terms .It should also be noted that 
the suggestions which may be given by the panels or the Appellate Body are non binding 
and may be resisted by the defendant. This vagueness of general orders gives the 
defendant the room to find politically acceptable means of compliance which may not be 
acceptable to the complainant, and this may drag the case on and on by setting 
compliance panels. In addition the said vagueness may enable large countries to 
manipulate smaller states into accepting partial compliance.86   
 
Thus it is suggested that the panels and the Appellate Body make more specific orders or 
recommendations. In addition they should make use of suggestions as provided in Article 
19 of the DSU. However, due to the fact that the panels are ad hoc and not permanent 
staff, it is difficult for them to make such orders and suggestions due to lack of time. 
Thus if the specific orders are to be made, this may require an institutional change of 
making permanent panelists. 
 
                                                 
85 With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994 or any other covered 
agreement, see Article 26. 
86 Hudec, R (1999) 10 
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4.6.2 (c) Strengthening the Compliance Monitoring System of DSB 
 
Article 21.6 of the DSU gives the DSB the role of keeping under surveillance the 
implementation of adopted recommendations and rulings.This surveillance by the DSB 
needs to be strengthened since it can be one of the ways of putting pressure on the 
Member which has violated the WTO Agreements. Since the issue of non-compliance 
can be raised by a Member during the DSB meetings, it gives room for other Members to 
show their interest in seeing Members abiding by their commitment. This is also 
commendable in that developing countries would be able to voice their concern together 
in support of each other. 
 
The Chairman’s Text also significantly elaborates surveillance procedures. It proposes to 
modify Article 21.3 of the DSU to require that a Member shall inform the DSB no later 
than 10 days following the adoption of the DSB recommendations of intentions to 
comply with such a ruling or recommendation. Currently the time period is 30 days.87 
This proposal is acceptable as it is aimed at shortening the time for the implementation of 
DSB rulings and recommendations. 
4.6.2 (d) Provisional remedies 
 
This is a proposal by Mexico which seeks to add a system of provisional remedies in the 
WTO.88 The essence of this proposal is that panels should have the authority to 
recommend interim measures in the form of a suspension of the challenged measure 
pending a final determination on its legality.  
 
This proposal attracts much criticism.89 First, it raises the question whether such interim 
measures should be limited to cases of particularly serious WTO violations. Secondly, if 
the panels need to evaluate economic damage in order to recommend an interim measure, 
this would imply significantly longer panel procedures, thereby defeating the essence of 
                                                 
87 See Article 23.1 of the DSU 
88  TN/DS/W/40 
89 See Bourgeois ,JHJ (2006) 143 
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interim measures. Thirdly, it is difficult for countries to suspend legislative measures and 
some administrative measures like anti-dumping measures. Fourthly, it would be 
inappropriate to authorize retaliation before the determination of compliance. Fifthly, it 
raises the issue of whether the respondent party would be compensated if the final ruling 
does not confirm the illegality of the measure. Sixthly, provisional remedies are difficulty 
to implement in practice given that panels are appointed on an ad hoc basis. It may be 
difficult for non-permanent panels to assume such a task. Finally, it can be difficult for 
Members to agree on circumstances which call for such provisional remedies.90As a 
result of the above criticism, it can be said that in the short term this proposal is not 
accepted in the short. Perhaps it may be accepted in the long term. 
 
4.6.2 (e) Retrospective Remedies 
 
There is a debate in the legal literature as to whether the DSU can be read as providing 
retrospective damages91. However, the understanding of Members is that the DSU only 
concerned with prospective remedies.92 Thus currently the multilateral trading system is 
about a balance of rights and obligations with WTO remedies to preserve future trading 
opportunities rather than to redress past injury93.It are recommended that WTO law 
should provide for both prospective and retrospective remedies. Customary International 
Law provides both for prospective and retrospective remedies. This is also provided for 
in the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission94. The implication of this is 
that a Member who is found to be in violation of WTO law should have the obligation 
both to stop the illegal act and to provide reparation for the damage suffered by the 
injured party. In international law, the leading case is that of Chorzow factories in which 
the following was stated: 
  
                                                 
90 See Davey, W.J  (2004) 36 
91 See Mavroidis ,P (2004) 1 
92 See Bercero, G and Garzotti, P (2006)140 
93 Although retrospective damages were granted in the WTO DSS in Australia-Subsidies provided to 
Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather DS126/Rw,adopted 11 Feb.2000 
94 Available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/convents.htm.   accessed on 6 March 2007        
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  ‘Reparations must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that had not been 
committed’.95
 
This is commendable in that it will give the offending country an incentive to comply 
early with the rulings and recommendations of the DSB since the longer they take to 
comply the more they are to pay. This then removes all the present incentives for delay in 
the dispute settlement process especially on the implementation and enforcement. Some 
authors have argued that retrospective damages are contrary to the fundamental notion of 
constitutional and democratic governance.96 For, instance, there are significant 
constraints on the ability of the governments to recall subsidies already provided legally 
and in good faith to private companies. 
 
Mavroidis (2004) supports the introduction of retrospective remedies in the WTO and 
even argues in a compelling manner that these retrospective remedies can be given in the 
WTO without any change to the current to the current DSU.97 He argues that 
retrospective remedies are the result of judge made law as the case of Australia Leather 
Article 21 litigation has confirmed.98 The calculation of the nullification and impairment 
should be in line with Public International Law. It is submitted however, that there is 
need for a clear provision to be included in the DSU rather than to rely on uncertain and 
unpredictable judicial activism. This is more so given that the WTO dispute settlement 
does not include the principle of precedent. 
 
Ehlermann (2004) also supports the introduction of retrospective remedies but seems to 
be hesitant on two issues.99 First, it concerns the difficulties which may be faced in 
evaluating damages for the past. However, since the panels have proved to be effective in 
proving the level of nullification and impairment for the future in spite of the difficulties 
in quantification. Then it can be argued that they may also be capable of calculating the 
damages suffered in the past. The second hesitation is on avoiding any further 
                                                 
95 1929 PCIJ Series A, No 8,4,p.21. 
96  Goh, G  (2003) 545-564    
97  Mavroidis (2004)  405 
98  Australian Leather case supra   
99   Ehlermann ,C (2004)  105-109   
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strengthening of the existing dispute settlement system as long as the political decision 
making process remains weak as it is. Enabling the dispute settlement to order both 
prospective and retroactive remedies would be strengthening the dispute settlement 
system which the said learned author is cautious about. 
 
 
Bourgeois (2006) argues that there are good policy arguments in support of retrospective 
arguments.100 Retrospective remedies counteract the incentive for protracting the dispute 
settlement proceedings, they are a deterrent against potential violators and more 
appropriate compensation for nullification and impairment suffered by the offended 
WTO Member. 
 
In conclusion, although there are criticisms leveled against the introduction of 
retrospective damages in the WTO dispute settlement system, it is argued that there is a 
strong and compelling case for the introduction of such damages and it is recommended 
that in the ongoing DSU negotiations, Members should take the stance for the provision 
of retrospective damages as this has basis in logic and is also in tandem with the 
principles of public international law. 
 
4.6.3 Proposals to enhance the threat of retaliation 
4.6.3 (a) Member sanction 
 
This proposal calls for the amendment of the DSU so as to reflect that WTO Members 
whose measures have been found to be inconsistent with their obligations, cannot bring 
forward a complaint on any issue against another WTO Member unless they have first 
complied with their obligations.101
 
However, the problem with this measure is that it can lead to growing disregard of the 
WTO rules by a Member who has been sanctioned. In addition, these sanctions are trade 
                                                 
100 See Bourgeois, JHJ (2006) 37 
101 See Mavroidis, P (2004) 400 
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distorting as other Members may act against the sanctioned Member’s interests knowing 
that it cannot complain. There other problem would be on whether the sanctioned 
Member would be able to complain against violations which were done when it was 
under sanctions. 
 
It is suggested that if such sanctions should be included in the WTO, they should be 
limited in time or even over a specified subject matter102.  
 
4.6.3 (b) Collective Retaliation 
 
This proposal was made by India and its effect is that where a Member has been found to 
be in violation of the WTO Agreement(s) and has failed to comply with the DSB 
recommendation or ruling, there should be joint action by all other Members on the 
suspension of concession. The effect of this is that there will be withdrawal of market 
access commitments by all Members of the WTO.103  
 
The above suggestion may work in favour of developing and countries in that where a 
developing country could not have retaliated; collective retaliation seems to create 
enough pressure to induce compliance by the respondent of whatever stature. For 
instance, if the US fails to comply with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB in the 
US-Gambling case,104 all other WTO Members including the heavy weights like the EC, 
China and Japan would join the retaliation process. This may induce the US to comply 
because industries in the US would put pressure on the US government to comply. Such 
pressure could not be generated if Antigua and Barbuda threaten the US with retaliation. 
 
                                                 
102 See  Mavroidis ,P (2004) 400    
103  See  Qureshi,  A.H (2004)  475  
104 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling WT/DS285 – United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services -WT/DS285.See 
WT/DS/OV/29, 9 January 2007 
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Even though the above proposal is enticing, it has its own setbacks. First, this proposal 
perpetuates retaliation. Retaliation by itself is trade restrictive and collective retaliation is 
even more trade restrictive. Secondly, it is most likely that Members would not agree 
with such a proposal especially given some Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and trading blocks 
and bilateral agreements some countries are in. It would be difficult to deny market 
access in such relationships. Thirdly, it would not compensate the affected industries for 
the harm caused by a violation. 
 
Broek (2003) argue that this proposal is legally unrealistic and legally unsound.105 The 
argument is that the nature of the obligations in the WTO is inherently reciprocal, and it 
can not be assumed that a Member has a legal interest in the performance of the WTO 
obligation perse, independent of individual benefits. Ehlermann (2004) points out that the 
implementation of DSB recommendations is expected to be achieved through the 
interactions of the parties in the course of dispute resolution.106 Thus if collective 
retaliation is implemented this may complicate the implementation process and 
fundamentally alter the structure of the WTO dispute resolution system. As a result, it can 
be argued that collective retaliation should not be implemented in the WTO.  
4.6.3 (c) Tradable Remedies 
 
This is one of the drastic proposals for reform of the DSU and it was introduced by 
Mexico.107  It states that: 
 
   “The suspension of concessions phase poses a practical problem for the Member 
seeking to apply such suspension. That Member may not be able to find a trade sector or 
agreement in respect of which the suspension of concessions would bring about 
compliance without affecting its own interests...There may be other Members, however, 
with the capacity to effectively suspend concessions to the infringing Member.” (WTO, 
2002, p. 5) 
 
                                                 
105 Broek, N (2003) 127 
106 Ehlermann  (2004) 112 
107 WTO. 2002. ``Dispute Settlement Body - Special Session - Negotiations on Improvements and 
Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding -Proposal by Mexico,'' November 4, catalogue 
record TN/DS/W/23. 
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The Mexican proposal gives the rational for tradable remedies within WTO as follows:  
     “Incentives for Compliance: Facing a more realistic possibility of being the 
subject of suspended concessions, the infringing Member will be more inclined 
to bring its measure into conformity.” (WTO, 2002, p. 6) 
 
and 
 
“Better readjustment of concessions, since the affected Member would be able to 
obtain a tangible benefit in exchange for its right to suspend.” (WTO, 2002, p. 6) 
 
This explanation given by Mexico is to a larger extent reflective of the predicament of 
developing countries when they reach the suspension of concessions phase of WTO 
dispute. 
 
In a technical paper written by Bagwell et al (2003),108 their theoretical results supports 
the Mexican proposal that auctioning of countermeasures in the WTO can lead to both 
better incentives for compliance and better readjustment of concessions. The third 
potential benefit they identified is that by auctioning countermeasures in the WTO, the 
existing right of retaliation may be more efficiently allocated to the WTO Members who 
value this right highly. In addition, the Mexican proposal offers the a possibility of to 
injured WTO Members to get something from the dispute settlement mechanism without 
putting into question the legal nature of the existing contract, that is, the predominantly 
de-centralized system of enforcement in the WTO. However, these authors did not 
propose a concrete re-design of the DSU. They also highlighted the need to consider the 
political effects of such tradable remedies. 
 
Research undertaken by Potipiti (2005) went further on how such a design of tradable 
remedies would work in practice.109 It was observed that a buyer with the lowest 
valuation for the good may get the good and the allocation is inefficient. It was also noted 
that numerical results suggest that the optimal mechanisms cannot be implemented by an 
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109 Potipiti , T (2005) 1  
 31
ordinary auction scheme. Thus it was concluded that allowing retaliation to be tradable 
might weaken rather than strengthen the WTO enforcement system. 
 
Bronckers (2005) argues against this idea of tradable remedies. In his criticism against 
both tradable remedies and collective remedies they stated as follows: 
     ‘While recognizing that the position of some developing countries merits 
differentiated treatment, these two proposals continue to require the retaliating country to 
shoot itself in the foot, and to create costs for innocent bystanders. In the case of tradable 
retaliation rights, one can also seriously wonder why one country would buy another 
country’s problems, only to then shoot itself in the foot on someone else’s behalf’.110
 
In practice, retaliation has been resorted do in very few cases. From 1995, it has been 
authorised only in 15 cases.111 This suggests that there may be very limited market, if 
any, for a transfer of retaliation rights.112 Due to the problems associated with retaliation 
and the political ramifications which can arise from tradable remedies, it is most unlikely 
that this proposal would see the light of the day .However, it should be noted that if this 
proposal were to be successful, it would have relieved the developing countries in finding 
a way to getting a remedy in WTO given the asymmetry of power in the WTO. 
4.6.3 (d) Cross Retaliation 
 
Cross- retaliation refers to a situation where a winning party is authorized to suspend 
concession on other sectors apart from those being the subject matter of the case.113 This 
is meant to increase developing countries’ capacity to retaliate. However, even the case 
of EC Bananas III has shown that cross-retaliation by developing countries may do 
nothing against the economy of a trading block like the EU or large economies like the 
US. As a result, the proposal is not feasible as it hurts the economies of developing 
countries and faces all other setbacks of retaliation mentioned above. 
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4.6.3 (e)The sequencing problem 
 
This proposal seeks to resolve the conflict in Articles 21.5 and 22. This issue which 
became apparent in the Bananas case has been discussed in the previous chapter. The 
proposal is aimed at amending the DSU to clearly show that the application for 
suspension of concession should only be done after it has been proven that the purported 
compliance by the respondent was inadequate. It is suggested that this proposal should be 
accepted by Members so that the issue may be settled so as not to rely on bilateral 
settlement of the issue as was done by the EC and US in the EC Bananas case114.  
4.6.3 (f) Procedures to terminate retaliation 
 
The present DSU does not provide for a procedure to terminate the suspension of 
concessions and other obligations put in place by complaining parties if there is still a 
disagreement on compliance after implementing parties have taken new measures to 
comply. Thus there is a need for an institutional mechanism to authorize the withdrawal 
of suspension of concessions and other obligations. It is suggested that the parties should 
be allowed to use the Article 21.5 panels to request a withdrawal of a DSB authorization 
of suspension of concession and other obligations115. 
 
4.6.4 Proposals to enhance the value of compensation 
4. 6.4 (a) Request for compensation 
 
The Chairman’s Text proposed a new Art.22.2 bis which would deal with requests for 
compensation116. Once a request is made, the responding Member would be expected to 
                                                 
114 European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27 
 
115 See Suzuki, Y (2006) 367, where the said author calls the procedure a ‘mirror mechanism’ which allows 
the party to apply for the withdrawal of retaliation. This problem is also linked with that of lack of 
incentives for compliance, where a party can be rewarded for partial compliance. However, the author 
argues that such incentives may have an overall negative effect on compliance and resultantly perpetuate 
trade restrictive measures. 
116 See The Chairman’s Text(supra)  
 33
make a compensation proposal within 20 to 30 days. Non-trade compensation is 
explicitly mentioned as a possibility. The aim of this change is to promote use of 
compensation, as opposed to suspension of concessions because compensation is trade 
liberalizing yet suspension of concessions and other obligations achieves the opposite. 
This proposal is acceptable as it seeks to expedite the implementation process and also to 
promote compensation rather than retaliation, which is trade restrictive. 
 
4.6.4 (b) Financial or Monetary Compensation In the WTO 
  
Where a respondent has failed to withdraw or amend a WTO inconsistent measure, the 
current system of remedies in the WTO provides Members with a choice between trade 
compensation and retaliation. Trade compensation can only be achieved where both 
complainant and respondent agree and this is usually difficult to achieve. This may lead 
to punishment of innocent industries in both complainant and respondent Members’ 
territories. Retaliation distorts trade and developing countries have no muscle to retaliate 
against developed countries without seriously hurting their own economy.117
Resultantly, it is recommended that financial compensation should be introduced in the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Repatriation by governments of injury for which they 
are held liable is acceptable under public international law.118 This remedy was proposed 
in the GATT for the first time in 1966.119 There are also proposals to the same effect in 
the ongoing DSU negotiations.120 Bronckers and Broek (2005) support the proposal and 
succinctly capture the following compelling advantages of financial compensation121. 
First, it is not trade restrictive. Secondly, it helps redress injury. Thirdly, it may work 
better to induce compliance. Fourthly, it does not lead to disproportionate burden on 
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International Law Commission at its 53rd  session (September 2001), Supplement No. 
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119  See Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General Agreement, COM, TD/F/4, (4 
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120 See Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference-The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 
Communication from Pakistan to the General Council,’WT/GC//W/162 (1 April1999).See also Least 
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innocent bystanders. Fifthly, it can be a disincentive to foot-dragging in the 
implementation and enforcement process. Sixthly, it is in line with general public 
international law and finally, it can add an element of fairness. 
The same authors also discussed the systemic issues and other setbacks poised by 
financial compensation.122  
 
In the end, the provided the following as the key elements of financial compensation.123
1. that the DSU should be amended and make specific provision for financial 
compensation as a remedy. 
2. that financial compensation should provide for compensation for the damages 
caused 
3. that the distribution of the money for compensation be within the sovereign 
discretion of each Member 
4. that the victim should have the right to choose traditional trade retaliation and the 
new monetary damage remedy 
5. that the monetary damages should be retroactive to the time of infringement 
6. that the financial compensation would be preset at a certain annual amount of 
financial compensation for all types of violations 
7. that only developing countries, and LDCs should be allowed to claim financial 
compensation for an initial period of time and; 
8. that a system of financial compensation could be put in place for all covered 
agreements. 
The said authors recommended that the financial compensation should not be a 
replacement of the other remedies in existence but should co-exist with them.124
 
It is submitted that the above approach is commendable and is acceptable in logic and in 
principle. Its main strength is that it seeks to broaden the existing framework of remedies 
rather than trying to invent and a new system. This approach is likely to be acceptable to 
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Members especially the developing countries since they are likely to receive a tangible 
cure in the event of any violation against them. 
 
In US-Copyright case125, US and EC made a mutually satisfactory temporary agreement 
in terms of Article 22 of the DSU where the US makes a payment to a specific private 
body in the EC as a temporary arrangement during implementation. O’Connor and 
Djordjevic (2005) in their commentary to the above case acknowledged that a system of 
monetary compensation is acceptable in principle.126 They advanced that such a change 
would require the amendment of the DSU to clearly reflect the monetary compensation 
and it should not be left to judicial activism as in the above case. In addition, 
consideration should be given on how such compensation should be administered in the 
WTO Members’ national legal systems for the purpose of ensuring the basic principles of 
transparency and predictability. 
 
Although this suggestion has a lot of strength, it also has its setbacks. For many Members 
it may require authorization by legislature, and this could imply significant delays.127 The 
other challenge is that financial compensation is hardly practical in big cases and at the 
same time it may provide too easy way out of compliance in small cases. There are some 
situations where this remedy does not make sense, for instance, it is not an efficient 
remedy to stabilize a non-compliance situation with the provision of subsidy to the 
affected industry in the complainant Member.128
 
Despite the above criticism this remedy warrants consideration. It could introduce an 
element of greater equity in view of the fact that developing countries that may lack 
sufficient retaliation power can be compensated financially. This remedy is practical and 
achievable, and is in the interest of developing countries. It should be considered 
seriously in the ongoing negotiations.  
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 4.6.5 Proposals for the improvement of special and differential provisions in the 
WTO dispute settlement system. 
4.6.5 (a) Adding a development dimension to the Dispute Settlement 
 
The LDC Group and the African Group have proposed adding a requirement that a panel 
make a finding on the development implications of the issues in a case and consider 
adverse impact that its findings may have on the social and economic welfare of a 
developing country in a case. The DSB is supposed to take such findings into account in 
making its recommendations.129
 
Davey (2004) noted that given controversies over what policies are in the best 
development interest for developing countries, it is not clear what such a requirement 
should add in practice.130  Moreover, the heart of the requirement is that the DSB should 
take such findings as are made of these issues into account in making its 
recommendations.131 However, given the way in which the DSB makes such decisions, 
that is, by reverse consensus, it is not clear how it would ever take such findings into 
account in a meaningful way. Thus this can be an example of an SDT provision that 
would be very difficult to operate in practice.132
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has shown that there are numerous proposals for DSU reform. However, 
most of there proposals are either too radical or are far more trade restrictive therefore 
undesirable. Since the WTO dispute settlement is still evolving, it may be too early to 
adopt radical proposals which may fundamentally alter the operation of the DSB. Thus 
there is a need to strike a balance between improving and preserving the WTO dispute 
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settlement system. The next chapter gives some general and specific recommendations 
for the improvement of the WTO dispute settlement system.   
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DSU REFORMS: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The question of reform of the WTO dispute settlement system is very important to the 
WTO Members. The issue of strengthening the implementation and enforcement of DSB 
recommendations and rulings directly affects the level of enforcement pressures which 
would be applied to governments in violation of WTO obligations. Changes in this area 
confront the central issue of how strong the WTO Members want their legal system to 
be.133 It should also be noted that whatever the legal niceties of the recommendations to 
be taken, the issue of reforming the DSU rests with the WTO Members who make their 
decisions by consensus, so the reforms should be acceptable to all Members.134 This 
underpins some of the difficulties in reforming the DSU. 
 
There are different schools of thought on the manner and nature of the DSU reforms 
pertaining implementation and enforcement of DSB rulings and recommendations. On 
one hand, some prefer to preserve and strengthen the existing system. Thus they speak of 
'broadening the existing remedies.135 On the other hand, some are suggesting revamping 
the whole system and starting an alternative system of implementation and 
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enforcement.136 While the latter seems to be innovative and enthusiastic, it is always 
important to note that a sweeping and radical change is difficult to get especially when 
dealing with states. In the first place it should be noted that a weak enforcement was 
deliberate and unless there is a political will to change by Members, no radical changes 
can be adopted137. Thus this chapter will suggest a mixed bag, which is, preserving and 
strengthening the current regime while at the same time accommodating some new ideas 
on improving the system. 
 
The next part will deal with general recommendations for reform which are drawn from 
the discussion in previous chapters, and will be followed by specific recommendations 
which seek to formulate a new package of remedies .The final part will be the conclusion. 
It should be taken into account that although these recommendations focus on 
implementation and enforcement of DSB rulings, they cannot done in clinical isolation 
but they form part of broad and interrelated reforms which need to be done to the WTO 
dispute settlement system.  
 
5.2 GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• It is recommended that Panels and the Appellate Body make specific orders or 
recommendations, which are not broad. They should avoid orders that are too 
general and open to many interpretations, making it possible for developed 
countries to manipulate weaker countries concerning compliance. 
• It is recommended that the Panels and Appellate Body should make use of 
suggestions as provided in Article 19 of the DSU. This would give guidance to 
the parties on how best they can implement the DSB recommendations and 
rulings. In the event of a dispute over whether the measures taken by the losing 
defendant have led to full compliance with DSB recommendations and rulings, it 
is usually the original panel which becomes the compliance panel. Instead of 
waiting until a dispute arises, it is suggested that the panelists and the Appellate 
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Body be proactive in giving suggestions on implementation. This may as well 
expedite the implementation process.  
• It is recommended that the time in which a member needs to notify the DSU of its 
intention to comply with a recommendation or ruling according to Article 21.3 be 
reduced from 30 to 10 days. 
• It is recommended that the DSU be amended to solve the sequencing problem on 
Article 22.5 and 22 of the DSU. 
• It is recommended that the reasonable period of time for implementation be kept 
as it is but the compliance panels should take the special needs of developing 
countries on case by case basis where a developing country is a losing defendant.  
• It is recommended that the compliance monitoring mechanism of the DSB should 
be strengthened. 
• There is a need to look for new tools for improving the interaction between the 
WTO and domestic process. However, the discussion on such a mechanism is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
• There is need for clarification on how the interests of the developing countries are 
to be taken into account in terms of Article 21.7 and 21.8 of the DSU. Such 
clarification should make such a special and differential provision legally binding, 
justiciable and enforceable. 
• It is suggested that DSU reform negotiators should take note of the experience of 
the Appellate Body and the WTO on some procedural changes to the DSU. 
• There is a need for a procedure to terminate suspension of concessions and other 
obligations if there is still a disagreement on compliance after implementing 
parties have taken new measures to comply. 
 
5.3 SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The previous chapter provided many proposals for DSU reform and most of them were 
criticized to show their suitability to be included in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
Given the need for developing countries to access the remedies under the WTO dispute 
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settlement system, it is recommended that the following model of remedies be adopted by 
the WTO.138
The WTO dispute settlement system should adopt financial compensation and the 
payment should be quantified from the date of the infringement. The key elements of this 
model are as follows: 
• There is need to amend the DSU to clearly include financial compensation as one 
of the remedies. This new remedy should co-exist with current remedies, namely 
compensation and retaliation. 
• Retroactivity should be in the WTO dispute settlement system. This would mean 
that financial compensation, compensation and retaliation should be quantified 
from the time of infringement, or at least from the date of commencement of 
dispute settlement proceedings. 
• Financial compensation should be awarded to developing and least developed 
countries only.  
• There should be a transparent mechanism on how such financial compensation 
should be distributed in the receiving countries in order to benefit the affected 
industries, otherwise that money may be diverted for other use and this would 
erode the benefit of this remedy and would also hinder and affect international 
trade. 
• Where a developing country is a losing defendant, it should not be expected to 
give monetary compensation to developed countries. 
• Use of trade compensation and financial compensation should be encouraged. 
• This remedy should co-exist with other remedies which are already in place in the 
WTO dispute settlement system.   
 
The weaknesses of this model is that financial compensation cannot  replace the 
withdrawal of an offending measure .Secondly, the money which is supposed to 
compensate the affected industries can be misused if there are no proper mechanisms to 
curb such misappropriation. The loans and grants from IMF and World Bank which are 
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supposed to be used for development are misused139. Thus developing countries need to 
improve on governance and stakeholders’ participation within a country. The other 
inherent weakness which is not peculiar to this remedy is that the developing country 
would be at a loss if the developed Member does not have the political will to pay 
financial compensation. The developing country would be back to square zero. 
 
However, the strength of this remedy is that it is less trade restrictive and has the 
potential of compensating for injury incurred if compensation is granted retroactively.  
Secondly, it can give a defendant who is under a temporary political pressure a leeway 
for not complying with the DSB recommendations and rulings. Thirdly, it does 
fundamentally alter the existing remedies, thus it can be easily be acceptable to WTO 
Members. It can be said that the merits of financial compensation with a retroactive 
element outweighs its demerits. Developing countries have been clamoring for this 
remedy for over four decades now and it’s high time financial compensation be taken 
seriously in the WTO.140 Thus this proposal is accepted both in logic and in principle. 
 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
 
Reform of the DSU needs a political commitment from Members of the WTO. Apart 
from the above remedies, there is need a for community pressure among the Members to 
obey WTO recommendations and rulings. Members should use the DSB meetings to put 
pressure on those countries who do not comply with DSB rulings. This naming and 
shaming mechanism is important in international relations and would create enough 
incentive to comply with DSB recommendations and rulings. It is hoped that over a long 
period of time, there would be no need to resort to cohesive measures to ensure 
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140 See Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Legal Amendments to the General Agreement, COM,TD/F/4, (4 
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compliance but the peer pressure from other Members would force a Member to comply 
in order to be a ‘good citizen’  in the international community.  
In the meantime, however, it is recommended that compliance panels should have a more 
active role taking the special circumstances of the developing and least developed 
countries in the implementation and enforcements of DSB recommendations and rulings. 
At the same time, developing and least developed countries should be united and speak 
with one voice and negotiate for more binding special and differential treatment 
provisions and more effective enforcement mechanisms within the WTO dispute 
settlement system in the ongoing DSU reform negotiations. 
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